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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
D. W. RoBixsox, II*
Predictably, the fourteenth amendment and its restrictions on
the state governments, particularly in the "civil rights" area,
received the most attention during the period under review. New
lines were drawn in the definitions of "state action," while the
area between a breach of the peace and the protected exercise of
first amendment rights was further clouded. Among other ques-
tions, segregation, voter apportionment, the right to counsel, and
religious freedom received important court attention. This year,
like other recent years, has brought far reaching changes to tra-
ditional concepts.
THE CoNsTrTuow or T mh Uw STATES
I. TnE FOUITEENTH A3MENDMENT
A. "State Action"
1. Sit-in Demonstrations
In a series of "sit-in" decisions, the United States Supreme
Court expanded the traditional concept of "state action" under
the fourteenth amendment to what may prove to be the outer
most limits.' On August 9, 1960, ten Negro demonstrators seated
themselves at the lunch counter of the S. H. Kress Company
store in Greenville, South Carolina and demanded service. The
counter was closed, and upon arrival of the police, the manager
asked the demonstrators to leave. When they refused, they were
arrested for trespass under the newly amended South Carolina
Trespass Statute.2 The affirmance of their convictions by the
South Carolina Supreme Court was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court in Peterson v. City of Greenville.3 The
store manager testified that his decision to refuse the demon-
strators service was based partly on private choice and partly
on his desire to comply with a Greenville city ordinance requir-
* Robinson, McFadden & Moore, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. Given the opportunity, a divided Court failed to extend the concept
further in Bell v. Maryland, 84 S. Ct. 1814 (1964), Barr v. City of Columbia,
84 S. Ct. 1734 (1964), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 84 S. Ct. 1697 (1964)-
cases not covered by this survey.
2. S.C. CoDn ANN. § 16-388 (1962).
3. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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ing segregation of the races in lunch counters. 4 In finding that
the decision upholding the refusal of service was racially dis-
criminatory and that there was prohibited "state action" or
official involvement in the mere existence of the city ordinance,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren for the majority said:
Consequently these convictions cannot stand, even assuming,
as respondent contends, that the manager would have acted
as he did independently of the existence of the ordinance.
The State will not be heard to make this contention in sup-
port of the convictions. For the convictions had the effect,
which the State cannot deny, of enforcing the ordinance
passed by the City of Greenville, the agency of the State.
When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to
discriminate against other persons because of race, and the
State's criminal processes are employed in a way which
enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a
palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the
discriminators.5
In the companion case of Avent v. Nortb Carolina,6 involving
a similar city ordinance of Durham, N. C., which had not been
called to the state court's attention, the convictions of the lunch
counter sit-in demonstrators was vacated and remanded for re-
consideration by the state court in light of the Peterson decision.
On the other hand, the trespass convictions of demonstrators in
five separate department stores in Birmingham, Alabama, where
such an ordinance also existed, were simply reversed, although
there was no indication that the ordinance had been considered
by the state court.
7
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision of the group was Lon-
bard v. Louisiana.8 Under circumstances similar to those in
Peterson, four demonstrators were convicted in New Orleans of
criminal mischief (akin to trespass). No state statute or city
ordinance required racial segregation of the lunch counters.
However, a few days prior to the demonstration, the mayor and
chief of police had issued highly publicized statements con-
4. GREENVILLE, S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-8 (1958).
5. 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
6. 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
7. Gober v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
8. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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demning such demonstrations and stating that the laws would
be strictly enforced. Mr. Chief Justice Warren said:
As we interpret the New Orleans city officials' statements,
they were determined that the city would not permit Negroes
to seek desegregated service in restaurants. Consequently the
city must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance pro-
hibiting such conduct. . .. The official command here -was
to direct continuance of segregated service in restaurants,
and to prohibit any conduct directed toward its discontinu-
ance; it was not restricted solely to preserve the public peace
in a non-discriminatory fashion in a situation where vio-
lence was present or imminent by reason of public demon-
strations.9
In a separate opinion, 0 Mr. Justice Harlan contended that the
mere existence of the ordinance or official pronouncement should
not, standing alone, be sufficient to constitute "state action" pro-
hibited by the fourteenth amendment. He urged that there should
be some showing that the ordinance or pronouncement actually
influenced the decision of the private proprietor to refuse service.
While apparently leaving the freedom of the private property
owner to discriminate untouched by the racial discrimination
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, these decisions make
it abundantly clear that any lack of neutrality on the part of the
state or its subdivisions, through statutes, ordinances, or official
declarations, bearing on the decision of the private individual,
will constitute "state action" or public involvement in the racial
discrimination. At this writing it is safe to predict that even the
most insignificant and unknown state health regulation requiring
segregation in the private facility will make the state a party
to the proprietor's decision to refuse service."
2. Hill-Burton Participation
The Hill-Burton Act12 established a system of federal aid for
hospital construction across the nation. The statutory scheme
contemplated a survey of existing hospital facilities by the states,
with the federal funds being paid to the state, which in turn
passed them on to the particular hospital, private or public,
9. 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963).
10. 373 U.S. 248 (1963).
11. See Robinson v. Florida, 84 S. Ct. 1693 (1964), not covered by this survey.
12. 60 STAT. 1041 (1946).
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where the need for expansion of facilities existed. The act au-
thorized "separate but equal" facilities for Negroes'3 and appro-
priate regulations to this effect had been prepared by the Sur-
geon General.14 Certain Negro doctors, dentists and patients
brought a declaratory judgment proceeding against two private
hospitals in Greensboro, N. C., which had received Hill-Burton
funds, seeking desegregation of their facilities. The Department
of Justice intervened in behalf of the plaintiffs seeking to have
the "separate but equal" provisions declared unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of any show-
ing of "state action" under the fourteenth amendment. Sitting
en banc, the court of appeals reversed in Simkins v. Moses H'.
Cone Memorial Hosp. in a three to two decision.' 5
Relying upon Burton v. Vilmington Parking Authority,16
Chief Judge Sobeloff traced the state's participation in the Hill-
Burton program, the extensive state-federal sharing in the com-
mon plan and program of hospital construction, and the state al-
location of the funds, concluding that the hospitals were operat-
ing integral parts of the comprehensive state-federal plan to
protect the allocation of medical resources in the promotion of
public health. The majority concluded that, like the relationship
between the municipal parking authority and the private restau-
rant in Burton, the state had become so involved in the conduct
of the private hospitals that their activities were also those of
the state, even though the hospitals were not instrumentalities of
the state in the strict sense. The court then proceeded to declare
the "separate but equal" provisions of the act in violation of the
fifth amendment and unconstitutional.
Circuit Judge Haynsworth, joined by Circuit Judge Boreman,
in his dissent traced the mechanics of both the state and federal
programs to show that neither gave the governments any control
in the operation of the hospitals, but rather constituted a form
of subsidy, analagous to those given the tobacco industry, soil
bank programs, Small Business Administration, aid to colleges,
etc. The donor, he urged, could not be deemed "involved" in
operation of the donee in a constitutional sense simply because
of the gift. He further relied on Eaton v. Board of Managers of
13. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (ef) (1952).
14. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112.
15. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
16. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[Vol. IT
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the James Walker Memorial Hosp. as foreclosing the question
in the Fourth Circuit.yT
3. Common Law Definitions
In New York Times Corp. v. Sullivan'8 the Supreme Court
quickly disposed of the contention that no "state action" as con-
templated by the fourteenth amendment was involved in the
Alabama state court libel action between private parties. The
Court held that the trial court's jury charge defining the com-
mon law elements of libel constituted the application of state
law to the same degree as if the definition had been incorporated
in a state statute.
B. Civil Due Process and Equal Protection
1. Segregation in Public Parks
Relying upon the equitable principles of "all deliberate speed"
enunciated in the second Brown decision,1 9 the United States
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in Watson v. City of MHephis,2 0
affirmed the district court's refusal to order immediate desegre-
gation of parks owned by the city of Memphis, and the ordering
of submission of a plan calling for additional time for desegrega-
tion of the facilities. The Supreme Court reversed in Watson v.
City of Memphis,2 ' holding such principles inapplicable. The
Court reasoned that, unlike schools, desegregation of parks in-
volved no administrative difficulties requiring more time, and
that, in any event, sufficient time had elapsed since the Brown
decision in 1955 (this action having been instituted in 1960).
Said Mr. Justice Goldberg:
Since the City has completely failed to demonstrate any
compelling or convincing reason requiring further delay in
implementing the constitutional proscription of segregation
of publicly owned or operated recreational facilities, there is
no cause whatsoever to depart from the generally operative
17. 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958). There the court had concluded that even
though the Wilmington, N. C., hospital had received land and aid from the
city and county, it was not a public agency and that its segregated policy
toward Negro doctors was not unconstitutional. However, this decision was
overruled in a later proceeding with the court relying on the Simkins decision.
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
18. 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
19. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20. 303 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1962).
21. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
1965]
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and here clearly controlling principle that the constitutional
rights ought to be promptly vindicated.
22
Shortly thereafter, deeming the Watson decision controlling,
District Judge Martin ordered desegregation of the South Caro-
lina State Parks in Brown v. South Carolina State Forestry
Gommn.23 Judge Martin found the record before him substan-
tially identical to that of the Watson case, the South Carolina
Negroes having been denied admission to two park facilities
solely because of their race in accordance with the statutory laws
of South Carolina. For these reasons he felt it unnecessary to
consider certain pending discovery motions and granted the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. However, in view of
the far-reaching consequences of the decision, the court postponed
the effective date of its order for sixty days.
2. Segregated Schools
In MNeese v. Board of Eduo.,2 4 a Negro brought suit in fed-
eral court to require desegregation of school facilities in Illinois,
making no effort to exhaust the state administrative remedies.
The district court dismissed the action because of this failure.25
The circuit court affirmed.28 The Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Douglas, reversed, holding that since the
case involved only a federal constitutional right and since there
was no underlying or intermingled question of state law, resort
to the federal courts was permissible without exhausting any
state remedies. However, the opinion went on to note that the
available Illinois remedy was not so adequate as to preclude re-
sort to the federal courts.
Following the MHoAeese decision, Judge Martin in Brown v.
School Dist. No. 0027 refused to require the Negro plaintiffs to
exhaust South Carolina statutory remedies and ordered eleven
Negro children admitted to the previously all-white Charleston
elementary schools. The record plainly showed that, in applying
for transfers, none of the plaintiffs had exhausted the appellant
remedies provided under the school board rules promulgated
pursuant to the South Carolina Pupil Assignment Law.28 The
22. 373 U.S. 526, 539 (1963).
23. 226 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
24. 373 U.S. 68 (1963).
25. 199 F. Supp. 403 (E.D.IlI. 1961).
26. 305 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1962).
27. 226 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-247 to 21-247.6 (1962).
[Vol. 17
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court permitted several white students and their parents to inter-
vene and introduce uncontroverted evidence to the effect that
basic differences and disparities existed in the educability of the
white and Negro races, which differences formed a rational basis
for segregated educational facilities, thereby attacking the fac-
tual foundation of Brown v. Board of Edu. 2 9 However, the
court felt itself bound in this respect by the previous decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. The court required
general desegregation of all schools in the district beginning with
the 1964-65 school year and further ordered the district trustees
to give written notice thereof to parents of all pupils. The order
of the district court was affirmed and adopted by the court of
appeals in a per curiam decision.30
In Goss v. Board of Educ.31 the pupil transfer provisions of
another desegregation plan were declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. The Tennessee desegregation plans, as ap-
proved by the district courts and court of appeals,3 2 permitted
any pupil (without regard to race) to transfer from a school in
which he was in the racial minority to a school where he would
be in the race of the majority. The Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Clark, noted that even though the transfer provisions
were available to both races, they did not provide for transfer
from a racial majority to a racial minority and said:
Classification based on race for purposes of transfers be-
tween public schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . racial classifica-
tions are "obviously irrelevant and invidious." 33
3. Elections
A Louisiana statute provided that in all primary, general or
special elections the nomination papers and ballots designate the
race of the candidates. Negro candidates for election to a school
board in 1962 filed an action prior to election to enjoin the Secre-
tary of State from enforcing the statute. Their motions for a
temporary restraining order were denied and the validity of the
statute upheld by a three-judge court.34
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Brown v. School Dist No. 20, 328 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1964).
31. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
32. 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962); 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962).
33. 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963).
34. Anderson v. Martin, 206 F. Supp. 700 (D.C.La. 1962).
1965]
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In Anderson v. Martin85 the Supreme Court declared the stat-
ute unconstitutional in violation of the due process clause of the
fourtee.tth amendment. The decision concluded there was no
legitimaw state interest in pointing out the race of the candidate
as bearing upon his qualifications for office and that the statute
had the effect of encouraging a vote for or against a candidate
on racial grounds. Concluding that the statute itself promoted
the ultimate discrimination, Mr. Justice Clark said:
But by placing a racial label on a candidate at the most
crucial stage of the electoral process-the instant before a
vote is cast-the state furnishes a vehicle by which racial
prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group
because of race and for another.3 6
4. Courtroom Segregation
In Johnson v. Virginia7 the Negro petitioner was convicted
of contempt in a traffic court in Richmond. He had been seated
peacefully in a section of the courtroom reserved solely for
whites and refused to move when ordered to do so by the bailiff.
When summoned before the judge, who instructed him to be
seated in the Negro section of the courtroom, the petitioner
remained standing, stating that he preferred to stand rather
than be seated. Upon his refusal to obey the judge's further di-
rection to be seated he was arrested for contempt. The Supreme
Court held that the arrest and conviction were based entirely
upon a refusal to comply with the segregated seating require-
ments and, in reversing, reaffirmed the position that a state could
not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities.
5. Freedom of the Press
In what may prove to be one of the year's most important
decisions, the Supreme Court in New York Times Corp. v. Sul-
livanB$ applied the first amendment through the fourteenth
amendment to limit the state's right to award damages for the
libel of public officials. In 1960 The New York Times ran a paid
advertisement over the names of a group of individuals, includ-
ing some Negro Alabama clergymen, seeking support for the
35. 84 Sup. Ct. 454 (1964).
36. Id. at 456.
37. 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
38. 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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"civil rights" movement. The ad purported to described certain
police activities in Montgomery, Alabama, which descriptions
were, in large part, false. L. B. Sullivan, a city commissioner
charged with supervision of the police department, brought a
civil libel action against The Times and the Alabama clergymen,
claiming they had charged him with unfitness in office. Sulli-
van's demand for a retraction was ignored by the individual
defendants, with The Times replying that the advertisement had
no reference to him. At the trial Sullivan made no effort to prove
actual damages. The trial judge submitted the case under instruc-
tions that the statements in the ad were libelous per se and not
privileged, leaving to the jury the questions of publication and
whether the statements had reference to Sullivan. On the subject
of malice, the judge charged that the jury only need find malice
to sustain an award of punitive damages. A verdict of 500,000
dollars, the amount requested, was returned by the jury, and the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, adopting the general common
law principles of libel that where the words published injured
the person in reputation, profession, trade or business, or charged
him with an indictable offense or tended to bring the individual
into public contempt, they were libelous per se.39
The Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming previous decisions
that freedom of speech protections extended to commercial ad-
vertisements of an editorial nature. Tracing the historical pur-
pose of the first amendment to protect debate on public issues,
the Court reasoned that erroneous statements were inevitable in
free debate and must be protected if freedom of speech was to
survive. Then, speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan
said:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with
"actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.40
Therefore, the Court held, state law could not raise a presump-
tion of the existence of actual malice even though the defamatory
words were libelous per se if they were written of a public offi-
cial in that capacity.
39. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962).
40. 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 726 (1964).
1965]
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After spelling out this constitutional holding and observing
that a new trial would follow, the majority then proceeded to
review the evidence to determine whether the record could sup-
port a constitutional judgment for Sullivan. In so doing, they
concluded there was no evidence of actual malice in that the in-
dividual defendants had not authorized the advertisement to be
run over their names, and The Times had acted in good faith in
accepting the advertisement. Furthermore, the Court concluded
that the advertisement could not reasonably be construed as
referring to Sullivan. Thus, there was no evidence to sustain a
verdict in his behalf.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurring, construed
the first and fourteenth amendments as granting individuals
the absolute and unconditional constitutional right to criticize
public officials in their official capacity regardless of whether
the criticism was made with or without malice.
6. Freedom of Religion
The application of another South Carolina statute was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Yerner.4 1
The appellant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, refused to accept Sat-
urday employment on religious grounds, and was refused bene-
fits under the South Carolina Employment Security Act 42 on
the ground that she was not "available for work" 43 and had
refused "to accept available suitable work.",4 4 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court had affirmed the court of common pleas'
decision upholding the Employment Security Commission.
4 5
Mr. Justice Brennan, for the majority, reasoned that the state
was conditioning appellant's receipt of unemployment benefits
upon her foregoing the practice of her religion and that such
state pressure had the effect of burdening the free exercise of
religion, in violation of the first amendment, made applicable
here through the fourteenth amendment. The Court further
held that the record revealed no compelling state interest being
enforced by the eligibility requirements as applied to the ap-
pellant.
Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that
the effect of the decision was to require South Carolina to treat
41. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to -38 (1962).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-113 (3) (1962).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114 (3) (1962)
45. 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
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the appellant as available for work when she refused employment
for religious reasons, thereby giving official recognition to her
church. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice
White, relied on Braunfeld 'v. Brown,46 holding that the free
exercise clause was not offended when the state forbade a sab-
batarian to do business on Sunday. He argued that this decision
had the effect of overruling the Braunfeld decision. Further-
more, he reasoned that the effect of this decision was to require
the state to single out for financial assistance those whose be-
havior was religiously motivated, even though it denied such
assistance to others whose identical behavior was not so moti-
vated.
Elaborating on the principles laid down in Engel v. Vitale,
4 7
the Supreme Court in cases arising from Maryland and Penn-
sylvania held that required religious exercises in public schools
were unconstitutional, Abington School Dist. V. Schempp.48 The
Pennsylvania statute required Bible reading, without comment,
at the opening of each school day, but permitted any child to
be excused upon the parents' written request. A three judge
federal district court enjoined the readings, holding that they
were in fact religious services with compulsory attendance.
49
The father testified that he had not sought to have his children
excused because of the possible adverse effect on their relations
with the other pupils.
The Baltimore case arose on demurrer with the atheist peti-
tioners alleging that, under the rules adopted by the school com-
missioners, Bible reading and/or use of the Lord's Prayer was
required at the opening of each school day, and that even though
the pupils were permitted to be excused, the rule was neverthe-
less a violation of their rights to freedom of religion and separa-
tion of church and state. Petitioners alleged that the ceremonies
in the public schools had the effect of placing a premium upon
religious belief as against non-belief, thereby encouraging the
pupils to question the morality and citizenship of atheists. The
trial court and the Maryland Court of Appeals sustained the
demurrer.50
Applying the establishment clause and the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, made applicable through the fourteenth
46. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
47. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
48. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
49. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D.Pa. 1962).
50. 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962).
1965]
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amendment, the Court held that no state could ally itself to one
particular form of religion but that it was required to remain
strictly neutral. Said Mr. Justice Clark for the majority:
Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases
at bar, we find that the States are requiring the selection
and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from
the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by
the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed as a
part of the curricular activities of students who are required
by law to attend the school. . . .We agree with the trial
court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises.
Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them
are in violation of the Establishment Clause.
5 1
The Court was careful to point out that the fact that the stu-
dents could be excused did not mitigate the unconstitutionality
of the services, since the very requiring of the exercises violated
the Constitution. However, the unconstitutionality of the services
was distinguished from the situation where the Bible might be
taught in a secular course for its literary and historic qualities.
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that so long as
the pupils were not compelled to attend the services, no violation
of the Constitution would occur. He would have remanded the
cases for further hearings on the question of compulsion.
C. Criminal Due Process
1. Breach of the Peace
The series of ensuing decisions in State v. Fields5 2 and City of
Rock Hill v. Henry13 covered in last year's survey of Constitu-
tional Law 4 leaves serious doubt as to the possibility of being
guilty of a breach of the peace where first amendment rights
concerning "peaceful expression of unpopular views" are in-
volved. After the state court's affirmance of the conviction of
the Orangeburg demonstrators for breach of the peace on the
ground that, even though peaceful, they were blocking pedestrian
traffic, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
51. 374 U.S. 223 (1963).
52. 240 S.C. 366, 126 S.E.2d 6 (1962).
53. 241 S.C. 427, 128 S.E.2d 775 (1962).
54. Sinkler & Guerard, Constitutional Law, 1962-1963 Survey of S.C. Law,
16 S.C.L. Rav. 39, 43 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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it for "consideration in light of Edwards v. South Carolina,"55
in Fields v. South Carolina.56 Upon consideration, the South
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its judgment, relying upon
State v. Brown,57 in State v. Fields.58 Citing the Edwards de-
cision, without further explanation, the Supreme Court reversed,
per curiam, Fields v. South Carolina."9
Somewhat more light is shed on the question by the Henry
decisions. The state court's affirmance of the breach of the peace
convictions of the Rock Hill demonstrators on the ground that
they had disrupted work in the city hall and jammed the streets
was also vacated for consideration in the light of Edwards.6 0
On remand, noting the history of the Fields litigation, the South
Carolina Supreme Court refused to construe the United States
Supreme Court as holding:
. . .[T]hat one has an absolute right to commit a breach of
peace, provided one is engaged at the time in the exercise
of a right protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. If one has an absolute right to commit
that crime, while so engaged, it would seem to follow that
one would have the right to commit other more grievous
crimes while so engaged. Since we cannot believe such to be
the view of the United States Supreme Court, we approach
the reconsideration of this case in the light of our original
interpretation of the Edwards decision. We have reviewed
the facts in this case, which we found more aggravated than
those in the Edwards case, and conclude that there is nothing
in the Edwards case to require a reversal of the instant
case.61
Subsequently the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in
Henry v. City of Rock Hill,6 2 holding Edwards controlling,
stating:
Edwards established that the "Fourteenth Amendment does
not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression
of unpopular views." . . . As in Edwards, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has here "defined a criminal offense so
55. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
56. 372 U.S. 522 (1963).
57. 240 S.C. 357, 126 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
58. 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 91 (1963).
59. 375 U.S. 44 (1963).
60. Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6 (1963).
61. 244 S.C. 74, 135 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1963).
62. 84 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1964).
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as to permit the conviction of the petitioners if their speech
stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of
those grounds may not stand."
0 3
Thus, if state court factual conclusions are really binding on
the United States Supreme Court, these decisions certainly weak-
en the doctrine of Terminiello v. Chicago, 4 and apparently hold
that the exercise of first amendment rights by peaceful expres-
sion of unpopular views cannot constitute a breach of the peace
no matter how disruptive that exercise may be on the community
life.
More understandable is the decision in Wright v. Georgia,"5
involving the application of the Georgia Breach of Peace Statute.
Six Negroes playing basketball in the city recreation park
normally reserved for whites refused to leave on police order.
There had been no disturbance and no other people were present.
In reversing the conviction the Court concluded that the gen-
erally worded breach of peace statute did not give the petitioners
adequate notice that their conduct was prohibited and that the
possibility of disorder by others could not justify the exclusion of
Negroes from a place where they otherwise had a right to be
present.
2. Change of Venue
In Rideau v. Louisiana,0 the Supreme Court reversed the re-
fusal of the Louisiana state court to grant a change of venue
when the accused's statement had been given wide TV coverage
in the community. A few hours after a man had robbed a bank,
kidnapped three employees and killed one, the petitioner was
arrested. The next day, and for two successive days thereafter,
his interview with the sheriff, in which he made several material
admissions, was given wide TV and radio coverage. The judge
refused to excuse for cause three members of the jury who ad-
mitted hearing or seeing the interview. In the majority opinion
written by Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court found a violation of
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment in
the refusal to change venue, since the people of the community
had been so repeatedly and intensely exposed to the confession.
63. Id. at 1043.
64. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
65. 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
66. 373 U.S. 723 (1963),
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Mr. Justice Harlan joined Mr. Justice Clark's opinion, dissent-
ing on the ground that there had been no showing that the trial
was in fact influenced by the adverse publicity.
3. Right to Counsel
Expanding on Hamilton v. Alabama,67 the per ouram decision
of the Supreme Court in Vhite v. Maryland,"8 reversed the con-
viction where the accused had confessed at a preliminary hearing
when he had not been represented by counsel. Although a later
preliminary was held at which he was represented, the confession
from the earlier hearing was introduced in evidence at the trial.
The Maryland Court of Appeals had confirmed the conviction on
the ground that the preliminary hearing was not a "critical
stage" in the Maryland criminal proceedings. 9 However, ths
Court concluded that because of the use of the guilty plea, the
preliminary in this particular case was critical:
Whatever may be the normal function of the "preliminary
hearing" under Maryland law, it was in this case as "critical"
a stage as arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner
entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken
at a time when he had no counsel.70
However in State v. -WMte,71 the South Carolina Supreme
Court distinguished and refused to follow the White v. Maryland
decision in the case of an accused who had not been represented
at the preliminary hearing. However, he had made no plea or
statement at that hearing, and the court refused to hold that the
preliminary was a critical step in the criminal proceedings, trac-
ing the purpose of the preliminary simply to determine if the
state could show probable cause in justifying further criminal
prosecution. The court noted that a defendant was not permitted
to offer any evidence and that none of the evidence at the pre-
liminary was admissible in subsequent proceedings. Under such
circumstances, the court held there could be no denial of due
process to the accused.
67. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
68. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
69. 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877 (1962).
70. 373 U.S. 60 (1963).
71. 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
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4. Searches and Seizures
In what may prove to be another keystone decision, eight mem-
bers of the Supreme Court in Ker v. California,72 held the pro-
hibitions of the fourth amendment with respect to the standards
of reasonableness of searches and seizures applicable to state
criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment, thereby
expanding the principles of Mapp v. Ohio.7 3 However, the deci-
sion written by Mr. Justice Clark purported to leave some room
for differences between the standards applicable in federal crim-
inal proceedings as distinguished from state prosecutions:
This court's long established recognization that standards
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not as
susceptible of Procrustean application is carried forward
when that Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. And, al-
though the standard of reasonableness is the same under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our
federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence
held inadmissible because of our supervisory powers over
federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited
by the United States Constitution.
7 4
In this case the petitioners were convicted for the possession
of marijuana. After observing contacts between one of the peti-
tioners and a known marijuana dealer, the officers, having pre-
vious information that one of the petitioners had been suspected
of selling marijuana from his apartment, entered the apartment
without a search warrant and found the petitioners there. They
appropriated marijuana on the kitchen table, arresting both de-
fendants and, as a result of a subsequent search, found other
packages of marijuana in the kitchen and bedroom and in one
of the petitioner's automobiles. All of the marijuana found was
introduced in evidence. Five Justices concurred in affirming the
state court's ruling that the marijuana was admissible in evi-
dence, concluding that, in view of all the circumstances, probable
cause did exist to justify the search and seizure. They held that
the search and seizure were made incident to a lawful arrest.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Justices Douglas and Goldberg joined
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent on the admissibility of the evidence,
72. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
73. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74. 374 U.S. 33 (1963).
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on the ground that the police officers should have announced
their presence before quietly entering the apartment without the
owners' permission, unless there were compelling reasons why
this should not have been done.
II. L i.sILATmiv APPoRTioNBINr--AnTicLE I, SECTION 2
In the first of what undoubtedly will be a long line of like
cases, the Supreme Court in Wesbemry v. Sanders," declared un-
constitutional, in violation of article I, section 2, Georgia's 1931
Congressional Apportionment Statute. The suit was brought by
voters of Georgia's Fifth Congressional District (Fulton, De-
Kalb, and Rockdale counties) which, according to the 1960
census, had a population of 823,680. The average population of
the State's ten districts was 394,012, with one district having
only 272,154 persons. Two members of the three judge district
court concluded that the apportionment was grossly out of bal-
ance, but, relying on CoZegrove 'v. Green,7 6 dismissed the com-
plaint as raising only "political," non-justiciable questions.
77
Speaking for six members of the Court, Mr. Justice Black
relied on Baker v. Carr,,7 to sustain the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court and, after reviewing the constitutional debates on the
methods of representation in the legislative branch, said:
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the com-
mand of Article I, Section 2 .. .means that as nearly as
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's. . .To say that a vote is
worth more in one district than in another, would not only
run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic govern-
ment, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Repre-
sentatives elected "by the people," a principle tenaciously
fought for and established at the Constitutional Conven-
tion.79
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, felt the
matter of congressional apportionment was vested by article I,
sections 2 and 4, exclusively in that legislative body and was not
subject to judicial review.
75. 84 Sup. Ct. 526 (1964).
76. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
77. Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.Ga. 1962).
78. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
79. 84 Sup. Ct. 526, 530 (1964).
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III. FULL FArT A-D CREDrr---Anrrcr IV, SEmON 1
Following Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,"° the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Murdoek v. Murdok,8 1 refused to hold that a
Kentucky divorce decree was a bar to a South Carolina wife's
claim for alimony. The parties had lived in this state until the
husband deserted the wife and children and moved to Kentucky.
There he obtained a divorce by default. The South Carolina wife
was never served in the Kentucky proceedings but brought this
action in South Carolina for divorce and alimony, obtaining per-
sonal service on the husband. The court said the Kentucky decree
was not entitled to full faith and credit on the question of the
wife's right to alimony in the South Carolina litigation.
Tm SourH CAROLINA CoNs=r owuoN
I. Dum PRocEss, AnTICLE I, S~criow 5
In Sexton v. larleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,82 the South Carolina
Supreme Court was faced with a problem of whether the en-
forcement of the statutory lien against negligently operated
automobiles constitutes the taking of property without due
process when the automobile had been stolen from the owner.
The statute specifically provides that no lien for the negligent
operation of the automobile would come into existence if the
automobile had been stolen by the "breaking of a building under
secure lock or when the vehicle is securely locked."8 3 The con-
stitutionality of the statute having been decided, in Merchants &
Planters Bank 'v. Brigman, 4 in the absence of evidence that the
vehicle was securely locked when stolen, the judicial determina-
tion that the elements to establish the lien were present and the
enforcement thereof did not constitute an unconstitutional taking.
II. DIVORCE, ARTICz XVII, SEMON 3
As one of the permissible grounds for divorce, article XVII,
section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina lists simply
"desertion." In the enabling legislation, however, the Legislature,
as a ground for divorce, specified desertion "for a period of one
80. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
81. 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
82. 242 S.C. 182, 130 S.E.2d 475 (1963).
83. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 45-551 (1962).
84. 106 S.C. 362, 91 S.E. 332 (1916).
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year.""5 In Nofletti v. NoZlett 8 6 the South Carolina Supreme
Court was presented for the first time with the question of the
validity of the "one year" requirement as a prerequisite to grant-
ing a divorce for desertion. The wife's complaint, filed on August
15, 1962, asserted that she has been deserted by her husband on
July 11, 1962, and sought a divorce on the grounds of desertion.
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the
court compared the one year requirement to rules of evidence de-
signed to insure that a real desertion had occurred and concluded
that the requirement was consistent with South Carolina's strong
public policy to make marriages permanent and discourage sepa-
ration. Finding nothing in the specific language or purpose of
article XVII, section 3, indicating an intent to restrict the legis-
lative implementation on the grounds enumerated, the court up-
held the constitutionality of the statutory one year requirement.
III. CoxsTrrm oiAo A="3iws-Anlicrz XVI, SEcTIoN 1
As a part of the procedure to amend the state constitution,
the amendment is required to be ratified by the General Assembly
after voter approval and after being read three times on three
separate days in each house.8 7 In Geb7ardt v. McGinty,8 the
South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the question of
the validity of five constitutional amendments relating to the
debt limit of Beaufort County under article VIII, section 7, and
article X, section 5. After voter approval, ratifying legislation
was introduced in the general assembly which simply referred
to the titles of the five constitutional amendments. In the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Bussey the ratification was held ineffec-
tive because of the failure of the ratifying bill to contain the
full language of the proposed amendments. Noting that since
1868 it had always been the practice of ratifying legislation to
quote the constitutional amendments in haec ver 'a, the court
reasoned that the purpose of the "three times reading" require-
ment of article XVI, section 1, was to insure that the ratifying
general assembly be as familiar with the amendments as was
the electorate and the prior (and different) general assembly
which had proposed the amendments. Therefore the court held
the legislation attempting to ratify the amendments by reference,
rather than by a full restatement thereof, was void and inef-
fective.
85. S.C. CODE A-N. § 20-101(2) (1962).
86. 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963).
87. S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
88. 243 S.C. 495, 134 S.E2d 749 (1964).
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